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Abstract
Mathematics is a uniquely human capacity. Studies of animals and humaninfants reveal, however,
that this capacity builds on language-independent mechanisms for quantifying small numbers (!4)
precisely and large numbers approximately. It is unclear whether animals and human infants can
spontaneously tap mechanisms for quantifying large numbers to compute mathematical operations.
Moreover, all available work on addition operations in non-human animals has confounded number
with continuous perceptual properties (e.g. volume, contour length) that correlate with number. This
study shows that rhesus monkeys spontaneously compute addition operations over large numbers, as
opposed to continuous extents, and that the limit on this ability is set by the ratio difference between
two numbers as opposed to their absolute difference.
q 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Human adults, preverbal human infants, and non-human primates share two language-
independent systems for representing numbers: a precise system for small numbers (!4)
and an approximate system for large numbers (reviewedin Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke,
2004; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Hauser & Spelke, in press). At present, we lack an
understanding of whether these populations also share the same representational content
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human adults (Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999), preverbal human infants (Xu &
Spelke, 2000; Xu, Spelke, & Goddard, in press), and non-human animals (Brannon &
Terrace, 1998; Matsuzawa, 1985; Meck & Church, 1983) has revealed that large
numerosities are represented in the form of noisy mental magnitudes, with discrimination
between two numbers based on their ratio (Weber limit), as opposed to their absolute
numerical difference. Mental magnitudes can represent numbers for stimuli in different
modalities, including sounds and lights (Barth, Kanwisher, & Spelke, 2003; Dehaene,
Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998; Hauser, Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Patalano,
2002). Moreover, human adults (Barth, 2001) and 9-month-old infants (McCrink & Wynn,
2004) can add and subtract these representations.
What is not yet known is whether animals can spontaneously perform operations over
their large number representations. Some studies have revealed the ability to sum
representationsofquantity(Beran,2001;BeranandRumbaugh,2001;Boysen&Bernston,
1989; Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hegel, 1987). However, in these experiments
number generally remains confounded with continuous properties of stimuli, leaving open
the possibility that animals operate over representations of continuous amounts as opposed
to number. In addition, because these experiments involve training procedures, it is not
possible to draw direct parallels with studies of humans in which non-training methods are
employed. Those studies employing spontaneous methods, mathematical operations of
addition and subtraction, and using some controls for continuous extent, have only focused
on small numbers (Hauser & Carey, 2003; Hauser, Carey, & Hauser, 2000; Uller et al.
2001). This paper addresses these two gaps in our current understanding. We employ an
expectancyviolationlookingtimeprocedure,originallydesignedforhumaninfants(Wynn,
1992), and successfully adapted by animal researchers studying both numerical processing
aswellasothercognitivecapacities(Hauser&Carey,2003;Hauser,MacNeilage,&Ware,
1996).
2. General methods
The logic, procedures, and apparatus in these experiments have all been employed in
previous studies of rhesus monkey numerical representations (Hauser & Carey, 2003;
Hauser et al., 1996). Moreover, apart from the particular operations studied here, these
methods follow closely those of Hauser and Carey (2003).
All experiments were carried out with adult rhesus monkeys living on the island of
Cayo Santiago, Puerto Rico (Rawlins and Kessler, 1987). We used a between subject
design, and presented each subject with only one test trial, comprising either a possible or
an impossible outcome; we expected longer looking times at the impossible events relative
to both the prior familiarization trial as well as the possible test event.
2.1. Procedure
Before observing a test trial, we exposed each subject to two familiarization trials that
included all of the stimuli, the apparatus, and actions (Fig. 1). During Familiarization 1
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lemons (each about 6 cm in diameter) matched to the outcome of that subject’s test trial.
For instance, a monkey in the possible group of Experiment 1, 3C1Z4 or 8, saw four
lemons, while a monkey in the impossible group saw eight. Because this trial included the
number of stimuli comprised by the outcome of that subject’s test trial, longer looking
times during test could not reﬂect a preference for looking at novel displays, or a particular
number of stimuli. At the end of the trial, the experimenter cleared the lemons on the stage.
During Familiarization 2 (F2) the presenter placed the same number of lemons on the
stage as would be present at the beginning of the test trial prior to the addition of
the occluder. For instance, in Experiment 1, the experimenter placed three lemons on the
stage. During Test (T) the presenter started with an empty stage, and then placed the same
number of lemons on the stage as he had during F2 (e.g. three, for Experiment 1). He then
concealed the contents of the stage by lowering the occluder and, as the monkey watched,
added the number of lemons to the stage that constituted the second term in the operation
being tested. For example, for a 3C1 operation, he added one lemon and then removed the
occluder to reveal either a possible or an impossible outcome.
During impossible test trials, the presenter surreptitiously added or removed lemons
from the stage using a preloaded pouch attached to the back of the occluder. Before being
informed of the experimental condition (possible or impossible) the recorder eliminated
from analysis all trials in which the subject looked away from the display area during any
portion of the addition events. Digitized video records were coded blind with respect to
trial and condition (inter-coder reliabilities, 0.87–0.95). Some monkeys were excluded
from the ﬁnal analysis at coding due to poor video quality. Overall, we attempted to test a
total of 264 monkeys. The ﬁnal data set included 161 monkeys across all ﬁve experiments.
No monkey participated in more than one of the ﬁve experiments presented here.
For all ﬁve experiments, we ran unpaired t-tests comparing mean looking times (s)
during test (T) between groups who observed possible and impossible outcomes. We also
ran paired t-tests for the possible and impossible outcome groups, comparing within
Fig. 1. Familiarization and test events for monkeys in the impossible (A) and possible (B) test groups for a sample
condition: Experiment 1, 3C1Z4o r8 .
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set at P!0.05.
3. Experiments 1–3: 3C1, 2C2, and 4C4Z4o r8
The ﬁrst three experiments aimed to establish that rhesus (a) could discriminate
between numbers that differed by a large ratio, but fell outside the small number range
(1–3), and (b) could correctly discriminate between these numbers as outcomes for various
addition operations. Previous work with non-human primates has not found mathematical
competence for numbers greater than 3–4, except in laboratory settings involving
extensive training. Although tamarins have been shown to spontaneously discriminate
between large numbers of sounds, seemingly constrained by a Weber limit (Hauser et al.,
2002), no studies have explored whether they can use these representations to compute
mathematical operations. Moreover, in a search task with the rhesus monkeys on Cayo,
Santiago subjects failed to correctly choose a box with addition outcomes of eight pieces
of food over a box with four or three pieces; however, they successfully picked the box
with more food when the ratios were smaller but the total amount of food per box did not
exceed four (e.g. 2v3 and 3v4, Hauser et al., 2000). Because these experiments involved
the serial addition of food items, rhesus failures in the large ratio and large number cases
could be the consequence of an inability to operate over magnitude representations of
large numbers with addition.
Experiment 1 presented a 3C1 operation, Experiment 2 a 2C2 operation, and
Experiment 3 a 4C4 operation. We predicted longer looking at the outcome of eight for
Experiments 1 and 2, but longer looking at four for Experiment 3. Experiment 3 therefore
provides a control for the possibility that success in Experiments 1 and 2 is the
consequence of a preference for looking at larger numbers relative to small numbers.
3.1. Results and discussion
Subjects in all three experiments correctly discriminated between possible and
impossible outcomes during test (Fig. 2). Subjects looked longer (t(25)Z2.4, PZ0.03) at
an impossible outcome of 3C1Z8( NZ15) compared to a possible outcome of 3C1Z4
(NZ12); an impossible outcome of 2C2Z8( NZ12) compared to a possible outcome of
2C2Z4( NZ12) (t(22)Z2.14, PZ0.04); and an impossible outcome of 4C4Z4( NZ
17) compared to a possible outcome of 4C4Z8( NZ15) (t(30)Z2.5, PZ0.02). Similarly,
monkeys observing these impossible outcomes tended to recover their looking times
during the test trial (T) relative to their looking times during the F2 trial (3C1Z8, t(14)Z
2.2, P!0.05; 2C2Z8 t(11)Z1.55, PZ0.15, 4C4Z4, t(17)Z2.89, PZ0.009). No
signiﬁcant differences obtained when comparing F2 with the possible test outcomes.
These data conﬁrm the hypothesis that rhesus monkeys spontaneously discriminate
between and operate over representations of large numbers. What these data do not reveal,
however, is the format of their representations, nor whether the monkeys in these
experiments represent the number of objects in the displays, or just their continuous
J.I. Flombaum et al. / Cognition 97 (2005) 315–325 318perceptual properties. Experiments 4 and 5 provide one step toward addressing these
issues.
4. Experiment 4: 2C2Z4o r6
Given the monkeys’ success in the previous three experiments with outcomes that
differed by a 1:2 ratio (4 V 8), here we tested them on numbers differing by a 2:3 ratio. If
ratios, rather than absolute numbers constrain discrimination, then rhesus may fail at the
smaller ratios. We therefore presented subjects with either a possible 2C2Z4 event or an
impossible 2C2Z6 event.
4.1. Results and discussion
The difference in looking time (Fig. 2) for the possible 2C2Z4 outcome (NZ14), and
the impossible 2C2Z6 outcome (NZ17) was not statistically signiﬁcant (t(29)Z1.8, PZ
0.91). These results stand in contrast to those in Experiment 2, where subjects succeeded
on a 2C2Z4 or 8 task. Thus monkeys spontaneously represent and operate over larger
numbers in the form of noisy mental magnitudes. The noise is proportional to the value of
the numbers represented, and therefore accounts for an ability to discriminate between
numbers that differ by a large ratio, such as 1:2, but not numbers that differ by smaller
ratios such as 2:3. Future experiments will explore whether the success at 1:2 extends to
Fig. 2. Looking time results for Experiments 1–4 by trial and outcome.
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human infants.
5. Experiment 5: 3C1Z4 large or 8 small lemons
A confound in Experiments 1–4 is that number covaries with several continuous
dimensions. For example, monkeys may expect a particular contour length or volume of
lemons, as opposed to a speciﬁc number of lemons. Studies of large number addition have
not yet adequately demonstrated that animals can spontaneously operate over
representations of number as opposed to quantity. Accordingly, in Experiment 5 we
replicate the design of Experiment 1, but explore whether subjects are sensitive to the size
of the lemons used in these operations, and consequently, the overall lemon quantity
involved.
5.1. Methods
We generated three lemon sizes (Fig. 3A): small, medium, and large. Thus, eight small
lemons in a row were equal in total length to six medium lemons or four large lemons.
Monkeys in both the possible and impossible test groups observed 3C1 operations with
medium lemons. At test, however, monkeys in the impossible test group saw an outcome
of eight small lemons, while monkeys in the possible group saw an outcome of four large
lemons. If monkeys generated expectations on the basis of total lemon contour length or
volume, then they should expect to see about four medium lemons in length or volume.
Instead, monkeys in both test groups observed outcomes equal to about six medium sized
lemons in total contour length and volume. We predicted that if monkeys actually
represent the number of objects in the test outcomes, then they should look longer at a
numerically impossible outcome of 3C1Z8 compared to a numerically possible outcome
of 3C1Z4.
5.1.1. Stimuli
Lemons were cut at both their ends, while lying length-wise, so that large lemons
measured 7.3 cm in diameter, medium lemons measured 4.9 cm, and small lemons
measured3.7 cm. Lined upnext to oneanotherfour small lemons,sixmedium lemons, and
eight large lemons all occupied a total length of 29.3 cm (Fig. 3A).
5.1.2. Procedure
During F1 monkeys saw the number and size of lemons that they would see as the
outcome of their individual test trial (Fig. 3B). Thus monkeys who would see a
numerically impossible 3C1Z8 small lemons during test (T) saw eight small lemons at
F1; monkeys who would see a numerically possible 3C1Z4 large lemons at T, saw four
large lemons at F1. Therefore, monkeys in the possible and impossible test groups were
equally familiarized to their individual test outcomes.
During F2 monkeys in both test groups observed three medium sized lemons placed on
the stage. During test, monkeys in both groups observed all operations conducted with
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Speciﬁcally, all monkeys saw three medium sized lemons placed on the empty stage (as in
F2). These lemons were then occluded, and another medium lemon was added to the stage
behind the occluder. When the occluder was removed, monkeys in the possible test group
saw four large lemons, while monkeys in the impossible test group saw eight small
lemons. Accordingly, the events observed during T can be summed up as three medium
Fig. 3. Stimuli (A; large, small, and medium sized lemons, from top to bottom), design (B; impossible and
possible events), and looking time results (C) for Experiment 5.
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(numerically impossible).
5.2. Results and discussion
Monkeys looked signiﬁcantly longer (Fig. 3B) (t(45)Z2.065, PZ0.04) at the
numerically impossible outcome of eight small lemons (NZ25), compared to the
numerically possible outcome of four large lemons (NZ22). Moreover, monkeys
observing the numerically impossible test outcome looked signiﬁcantly longer during T
relative to F2 (t(24)Z2.095, P!0.05), though monkeys observing the possible test
outcome showed no such recovery in looking (t(21)Z0.336, PZ0.74).
Monkeys in both the possible and impossible test groups observed outcomes during T
that included individual lemons different in size from those observed during the operation
phase of the test trial. Moreover, the large lemons involved in the possible outcome were
individually more different from (C2.4 cm in length) the expected medium sized lemons
compared to the small lemons (K1.2 cm) used in the impossible test outcome. Similarly,
both test outcomes occupied the same, incorrect contour length, and both outcomes
included an impossible total lemon volume. Therefore, if monkeys in this experiment
tracked a continuous quantity other than number, they would have looked equally long at
both outcomes, or longer at the possible test outcome. However, monkeys looked longer at
the numerically impossible outcome of eight instead of the numerically possible outcome
of four, demonstrating that they represented number as opposed to continuous quantities.
This is the ﬁrst experiment to demonstrate that animals spontaneously represent large
numbers, not continuous quantities, and therefore suggests that representations of number,
speciﬁcally, are naturally available to animals.
6. Conclusions
In Experiments 1–3 rhesus monkeys correctly discriminated between outcomes of four
and eight for the operations 3C1, 2C2 and 4C4. These results demonstrate that rhesus
monkeys can spontaneously (no training) use representations of large numbers to compute
the correct sums of addition operations. Experiment 4 shows that this capacity is
constrained by a Weber limit since the monkeys failed to discriminate between outcomes
of four and six when the operation was 2C2. Finally, in Experiment 5 we demonstrated
that these abilities rely upon representations of number, per se, and not continuous
amounts, since the monkeys succeeded in discriminating between outcomes of equal and
incorrect continuous dimensions, but differing on the basis of number. Taken together,
these results suggest that noisy magnitude representations of large numbers that have been
studied extensively in lab training contexts (Biro & Matsuzawa, 1999; Brannon & Terrace,
1998; Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2000; Nieder et al. (2002)) are spontaneously available to
animals for use in mathematical operations.
One recent critique of expectancy violation looking time methods is the claim that
longer looking times during “surprising” test events may sometimes reﬂect a longer
looking preference for novel events, or, in the case of number, merely for larger numbers
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experiments, together with others (Hauser & Carey, 2003) are insulated from this critique
in several ways. First, because we employed a between subjects design, each monkey was
familiarized at F1 only to either the possible or impossible test outcome. Consequently,
monkeys in both groups were equally familiarized to their individual test outcomes.
Second, in Experiment 3, we demonstrated that monkeys look longer at an outcome with a
smaller number (4, not 8), so long as it is an impossible outcome. This result obtained even
though monkeys in the impossible group of Experiment 3 saw four lemons on the stage
during F1, four on the stage during F2, and then during T, they saw 4C4Z4. This insured
that the impossible test group of this experiment always saw the same exact perceptual
stimulus (four lemons) throughout a session. Finally, in Experiment 4, monkeys failed to
discriminate outcomes of four from six following a 2C2 operation. An interpretation of
our results involving a preference for novelty, familiarity, or larger numbers would have to
account for the signiﬁcant discrimination of four from eight in Experiment 2, but no
discrimination of four from six. We conclude that these ﬁve experiments, considered
together, can only be interpreted in terms of the rhesus monkeys’ understanding of
number, as opposed to any other, lower-level, perceptual features.
In previous studies (Flombaum, Junge, Santos, & Hauser, 2003; Hauser & Carey, 2003;
Hauser et al., 2000; Sulkowski & Hauser, 2001) monkeys have been shown to represent
small numbers (3–4) precisely, apparently with the use of discrete visual object
representations as opposed to continuous magnitudes. That is, monkeys’ in these
experiments could compare numbers that differed by small ratios (i.e. 2:3 and 3:4), though
they could not make any comparisons between sets of numbers that included any value
greater than four. In one striking example, rhesus even fail to choose a bucket with eight
pieces offood instead of a bucket with three pieces, though they succeed with comparisons
of 3 versus 4 in the same study (Hauser et al., 2000). Given the results of the experiments
reported here, an open question about the previous work is why the monkeys fail to use
magnitude representations in discriminating ratios of 1:2 or more. One possibility is that
the serial presentation of one item at a time in those studies fails to engage systems
dedicated to processing large numbers, perhaps because these systems require the
presentation of several items at once as occurs in the present studies. An additional
possibility is that in the two-box choice experiments, subjects must continuously update
the sums in two different spatial locations, as opposed to one in the current experiments;
such updating may cause greater noise with respect to large number representations and
their sums. Further research is required to illuminate this issue.
What our experiments do reveal, however, is that magnitudes can be employed to
represent and manipulate numbers at least as small as 4, values that fall within or at the
boundary of the small number range. Rhesus successfully discriminated between 4 and 8
lemons, but not between 4 and 6. No evidence thus far has demonstrated that animals or
human infants can make cross format number comparisons by representing a small set, say
of four lemons with discrete object representations, and then a larger set, of eight lemons,
simply as “more than four”. Moreover, such a comparison cannot account for the data
presented here because these types of operations should allow for the accurate
discrimination of four and six if they allow for the discrimination of four and eight.
Therefore, monkeys must represent the number 4, in our studies, with noisy magnitudes.
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represent all positions on the number line from 1–9 with mental magnitudes (Brannon &
Terrace, 1998).
Finally, these experiments raise several important questions for future research.
Speciﬁcally, we do not yet understand the limits on the large number system, and
especially, the extent to which different input modalities and training alter the Weber
ratios. One puzzling aspect of our experiments is the particular 1:2 ratio that monkeys
spontaneously discriminate. In training experiments (Brannon & Terrace, 1998) as well as
spontaneous experiments with tamarin monkeys (Hauser et al., 2002) 2:3 ratios and
smaller have been found to be within the resolution of the large number system. One
possible reason for this discrepancy is that operating over magnitude representations with
addition introduces additional noise that impairs discrimination (Barth, 2001; Barth et al.,
2003). Previous experiments involved only numerical comparisons, not addition. Other
possibilities, however, include the consequences of extensive training on discrimination,
or even species and modality differences. When an animal is trained for months and often
years before testing, does such experience improve discriminability of small ratios by
altering the analog magnitude system per se, or does it alter attention and thus reduce the
level of noise that might inﬂuence performance? If a species has evolved sensory
specializations in response to particular ecological or social pressures, might their capacity
for numerical discrimination differ depending upon whether the test material matches or
fails to match these specializations? For example, a highly visual animal such as a rhesus
monkey might show better discrimination with visual stimuli than a highly auditory
creature such as a bat. Exploring the role of artiﬁcial and species-typical experience in ﬁne
tuning the large approximate number system will help reﬁne our understanding of the
evolution of number representation in animals and humans.
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